When three is not crowd - Brahma Chellaney

Commentary by G.Parthasarathy

Asian Juggernaut: The Rise of China, India and Japan, Brahma Chellaney; HarperCollins, Rs 495



As Delhi's residents recover from the stifling heat of summer and prepare to change to their woollen clothes, the capital gets ready to welcome a stream of foreign dignitaries. President Hu Jintao of China is the flavour of the month in New Delhi this November. There is no dearth of enthusiasts who are ecstatic that Hu has condescended to visit India and repeat the old cliché of "Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai". They want India, China and Russia to unite against "US imperialism". In doing so they choose to ignore how the US and China have colluded against us in the Nixon and Clinton years. They also gloss over China's objections to the ending of international nuclear sanctions against India and its continuing role in enhancing Pakistan's nuclear, missile and conventional capabilities



Asian Juggernaut: The Rise of China, India and Japan by Brahma Chellaney is a clinical analysis of emerging trends in Asia, as China, India and Japan emerge as its main centres of power. Chellaney clearly spells out the challenges the major powers of Asia face as they seek to fashion a new balance of power in what many term as "Asia 's Century". Chellaney analyses factors like energy, terrorism, demography and environment that will shape the interplay of forces in a continent that is set to become the economic powerhouse of the 21st century. Can Asia soon emulate Europe where age-old nationalistic rivalries have been subsumed by a new era of shared commitment to economic prosperity and democratic pluralism?



In Chellaney's view, Asia still has a long way to go before this can be achieved. The deep animosities that emerged from the years of Japanese militarism cannot be wished away. Nor can one ignore China's unrelenting desire to become the dominant power in the world even while it is ruled by an autocratic regime adopting capitalism as its way to prosperity, while claiming to be Communist. These are realities that do not bode well for the emergence of European style integration in Asia in the near future.



Chellaney examines China's unrelenting quest for natural resources from gas and oil to metals and coal, as it seeks to ensure the security of its growing energy needs and its access to raw materials for its booming economy, which has grown annually at 9.6 per cent over the past two decades. Whether it is in Angola, Latin America, or Kazakhstan, China has pursued its goal for dominant access to energy resources with single-minded ruthlessness, combining military cooperation, supply of missiles and political support with large handouts of economic aid. India, with its leaden footed decision-making has been outbid, outflanked and outsmarted by the Chinese in every corner of the globe - from Angola to Kazakhstan.



Chellaney clearly brings out that China will accept India only as a junior partner in any effort to jointly bid for energy resources across the world. We risk losing out to China even in countries like Myanmar, because we lack a holistic approach to our energy diplomacy.



What has often led to some of our politicians and academics going wrong in their assessment of Chinese policies is their mistaken belief that it is Communist ideology, rather than rather militant nationalism bordering on chauvinism, which has guided Chinese policies. If Communist ideology was the main criterion guiding Chinese policies, how does one explain why Mao made common cause with Nixon and gave the Americans monitoring facilities on Chinese soil to monitor missile tests by the Soviet Union? What were the ideological differences, if any, that caused China to invade Vietnam in 1979, with Deng Xiao Ping proclaiming that China would teach Vietnam the same "lesson" that it had "taught" India in 1962?



Chellaney has brought out in detail how China's attitudes towards the outside world are driven by its "Middle Kingdom Syndrome", under which the Chinese are the only civilised people surrounded by either "vassals" or "barbarians".



Chellaney explains at some length the background to China's territorial disputes with virtually all its neighbours. India's own lackadaisical and sentimental approach to its differences on the Sino-Indian border was really caused by muddle-headed thinking and an absence of clarity about how China looked at its neighbours. It would have been useful if Chellaney focused some attention on Sino-Soviet border differences that led to serious clashes in 1969. But, he has focused attention on China's disputes on its maritime boundaries with virtually all its neighbours - Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. China evokes fear and respect in its neighbourhood because of its territorial ambitions and its propensity to use force whenever expedient, together with its readiness for political and economic engagement.



While China effectively "contains" India by providing Pakistan with conventional and nuclear weapons capabilities and seeks to surround India in South Asia, India has no strategy to counter China's containment. Is it not time, Chellaney suggests, for India to respond with building new strands of cooperation with Taiwan, Japan, Vietnam and others who are victims of aggressive Chinese territorial designs in the Asia-Pacific region? Further, given Chinese attempts to apply diversionary military pressure on India during the Kargil conflict, have we been too defensive on issues pertaining to Tibet?



Asian Juggernaut cites instances, such as President Jiang Zemin's comments to President Chirac, which show that the Chinese view India and Indians with condescension bordering on contempt. It is going to take a few decades and some drastic changes in the mindsets of India's leadership for India to develop an economic and military potential to play the role that Chellaney suggests.



Finally, one has to be cautious in presuming that the US will join India in developing a stable trilateral balance of power in Asia. Experience during the Nixon and Clinton years suggests that the US often joins China to contain India. This is true of American behaviour in the UN, even during the Bush Administration. Chellaney says strategies are needed to be framed by China, Japan and India based on "deterrence, stability and peace".