VIEW: How credible is Pakistani democracy? —Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi

Musharraf has rightly suggested that Pakistan faces serious internal challenges. However, these internal challenges cannot be addressed by continuing with the current strategy of cooption of the political aspirants on the terms and conditions laid down by the army-dominated power eliteCan Pakistan be described as a democratic state? The official circles maintain that Pakistan returned to genuine democracy with the setting up of elected federal and provincial governments in November-December 2002, bringing an end to the 4th phase direct military rule in Pakistan. President General Pervez Musharraf periodically highlights the representative and elected character of the ongoing political arrangements. Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz endorses President Pervez Musharraf’s statements and claims that all the basic ingredients of democracy exist in Pakistan. They also highlight the expansion of private-sector media over the last five years and the freedom of expression enjoyed by the media as an evidence of the government’s commitment to democracy.It is true that Pakistan is more democratic than was the case during the period of direct military rule (October 1999-November 2002). It is also true that the media is quite free to comment on the performance of the government. However, the focus of these claims is on the ritualistic and formal aspects of democracy; there is hardly any attempt to deepen and enrich it. Consequently, the freedoms enjoyed by the media and the societal groups are far below the critical mass leading to genuinely participatory, accountable and transparent governance.Pakistan cannot be compared with the African and Middle Eastern states to establish Pakistan’s democratic credentials. Pakistan’s political legacy is very different from these states. The British colonial rulers gradually introduced some elements of modern state, governance and the electoral process. By the time Pakistan became independent, the British had established differentiated structures of the three branches of government, competitive recruitment to civil services, professional civil and military services, constitutionalism, provincial autonomy, and political parties. They also introduced the electoral process for electing members to the national and provincial assemblies, although the electorate was limited.If we critically examine the political and administrative measures introduced by the British these might appear rudimentary in today’s context. However, their contribution was the initiation of pre-independence India to modern notions of governance and political management. The right of the people to set up political forums and parties, and engage in political mobilization enabled the Muslims to demand the protection of their rights and interests. The demand for the establishment of Pakistan grew out of these political processes. The Muslim League’s demand for a separate homeland got credence when it demonstrated its electoral strength for the Muslim reserved seats at the provincial and central level, especially in the Muslim majority provinces, in the 1946 elections.Therefore, the basic elements of participatory governance, parliamentary system and professional and non-politicalised civil and military services were part of Pakistan’s political heritage. Pakistan was to build on and reformulate these legacies to meet the challenges of creating a modern state and nation. This legacy gave a clear advantage to Pakistan over a large number of African and the Middle Eastern states. For Pakistan, the comparable case is India, which began its independent career with more or less the same political heritage, although it had some advantages over Pakistan. Pakistan’s political tradition dissuades Pakistan’s military and civilian rulers to become downright oppressive like many African or Middle Eastern military regimes in the 1960s or the 1970s. They adopted authoritarian governance and used the coercive apparatus of the state in a selective manner against their adversaries. General Musharraf’s government is no exception. It selectively targets political adversaries, especially those who openly challenge its legitimacy. It has dealt with the media, especially the press, in a subtle way, combining carrot and stick within an overall framework of freedom of expression. The way the Punjab government forced the ARY private TV channel to go off the air in the Punjab for over a day is a case of illegitimate use of state power. External considerations have also shaped the political approach of the military regimes. The need of external economic assistance and diplomatic support has dissuaded the military rulers from adopting a ruthless approach. If the Musharraf government has to project its image as a moderate government, it cannot be oppressive. Further, the Musharraf government can be somewhat tolerant because it has never been threatened by massive political revolt. Tolerance towards dissent has helped to improve the Musharraf government’s image and partly contributed to its longevity. However, the Musharraf government does not allow tolerance and freedom of expression to accumulate into self-asserting political force. Power is controlled by the president and army chief General Pervez Musharraf and his army/intelligence affiliates with a back up from top bureaucracy. They function as the pivot of power while the parliament and the federal cabinet suffer from power deficit. Important policy decisions are taken in the high level meeting presided over by the President rather than the federal cabinet. The high level meetings are held more frequently than the federal cabinet meetings. The parliament is marginal to power management in Pakistan. The president is bound by the constitution to open the parliament’s legislative year by addressing its joint session. The current parliament will soon complete four years but the president addressed it only once, on January 17, 2004. Occasionally, the president visited his chamber in the parliament house to meet with the parliamentarians but he did not fulfil his constitutional obligation of addressing the joint session. The most negative aspect of Pakistan’s current experiment with democracy is the decision of Musharraf to concurrently hold on to the presidency and the command of the army. No democratic arrangement warrants this. However, Musharraf views this as a security for his domineering role in the political process. If democracy is to be strengthened Musharraf will have to make two basic decisions: quit as the army chief and step back from his domineering role in the political process in order to empower the political institutions and processes. The combining of the political office (the presidency) with the professional service office has exposed the army to criticism from the political circles.Another key issue with implications for the future of democracy in Pakistan is the holding of fair, free and equal opportunity elections. The track record since 1977 shows that the administration is unable or unwilling to hold fair and free elections. The present-day opposition is unanimous in their view that fair, free and equal opportunity elections cannot be held under the Musharraf-led government. If the government used the bureaucracy and the intelligence agencies to manipulate the next elections, this might further fragment the political process and accentuate regional differences. If the opposition has not been able to launch street agitation, the government should not feel secure. If the people do not respond to the opposition calls, they do not trust the government either. They manifest widespread political alienation because they find themselves irrelevant to any change of government and power management in Islamabad. This manifests the people’s alienation from the political process because of a widespread feeling that they do not count in deciding about the rulers and the policies. If these trends continue the people will cease to think as a coherent political community. Musharraf has rightly suggested that Pakistan faces serious internal challenges. However, these internal challenges cannot be addressed by continuing with the current strategy of cooption of the political aspirants on the terms and conditions laid down by the army-dominated power elite. The political system must allow the mainstream political parties and their leaders to freely participate in the political process. If these changes are effected, most politically active circles will identify with Pakistan’s national institutions and processes. This will infuse enough resilience in them to cope with the internal challenges.

Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst