Trial by fire

Trial by fire
Musharraf crosses the border of trust
Gen VP Malik (Retd)

“I have confronted death and defied it several times in the past because destiny and fate have always smiled on me.” “… unlike most leaders, I am also a soldier, Chief of the Army Staff and Supreme Commander of my country’s Armed Forces. I am cut out to be in the midst of battle-trained, prepared and equipped. Fate and confluence of events have seen to it that Pakistan and I are in the thick of the fight against terrorism, caught right in the middle. My training has made me constantly ready for the assignment.”

This is how General Musharraf describes himself in his filmy style narration in his book, “In the Line of Fire”. His self-centered bluff and bluster, Kashmir obsession and anti-Indian mindset (“Not even my dead body would be landed in India”) would surprise only those who do not know General Musharraf.

The General is a master of fabrication. Starting his book’s Chapter 11, “The Kargil Conflict”, he writes, “1999 may have been the most momentous year of my life, assassination attempts notwithstanding. The events of that year, and the fall of 1998, dramatically catapulted me from soldiering to leading the destiny of the nation…It is time to lay bare what has been shrouded in mystery.” And then reveals the “mystery” as “Indian plan of an offensive was pre-empted….The initiative was wrested from them… finding a solution to Kashmir is owed to the Kargil conflict.”

General Musharraf claims that after taking over as Pakistan Army Chief (October 9, 1998), he learnt that India had reported five “make-belief attacks” in October-early November, and that the Indians were on the verge of attacking the Shaqma sector (opposite Dras-Kargil) in the summer of 1999 because (a) India had been “creeping forward” across the LoC ever since the Simla Agreement, (b) had not moved two reserve brigades out of Kargil-Ladakh during winter 1998-99, (c) procured large quantities of high altitude equipment and special weapons, and (d) Mr George Fernandes was visiting Siachen and Kargil frequently.

Based on this logic, he approved a “defensive maneuvre” by Pakistan 10 Corps/FCNA for “plugging the gaps” in mid-January 1999. (So much for our own intelligence brass who keep insisting that they had informed the government about the impending attack in June 1998!)

General Musharraf states, “The troops were given special instructions not to cross the watershed along the LoC”. Subsequently, he boasts that by May 15, the “freedom fighters occupied over 800 sq km of Indian occupied territory….I was kept informed of all movements of freedom fighters from March 1999 onwards….Our maneuvre was conducted flawlessly, a tactical marvel of military professionalism.” Will the Indian political establishment note General Musharraf’s acknowledgement that the Pakistan Army had (has) full control over jehadis operating in J and K?

During the Kargil war, the Pakistan Army brass, masters in operating behind smoke-screens, kept insisting that their regular troops were not involved in Kargil conflict. They also insisted that the LoC was vague, and Pakistan Army patrols, if any, were in “no man’s land”. General Musharraf has now lifted the veil over the mujahideen façade and acknowledged that Pakistani troops occupied Indian territory, thus deliberately violating the delineated LoC.

While the credit for “a flawless tactical marvel of military professionalism” during the initial part of the Kargil intrusion cannot be denied to Pakistani soldiers, such “military professionalism” is obviously not mujahideen’s cup of tea!

Lieut-Gen Nadeem Ahmad of Pakistan, while briefing an American team in January 2003, had confirmed that “there were no jehadis or mujahideen operating in concert with the Pakistan Army”.

General Musharraf’s narration conveys as if he was unaware of the preparations for the Lahore talks. He paints a poor picture of his own intelligence and others’ naivety. India neither had two reserve brigades north of Zojila nor was planning any offensive across the LoC. He remains silent on the tele-conversation between him and his Chief of General Staff of May 29-30, 1999, tele-conversations and the meeting of the DGMOs, and on abandoning hundreds of dead bodies of Northern Light Infantry soldiers in Indian territory.

He does not talk of poor logistical planning for Pakistani troops; some of them, when captured, had been without ration and water for days, or his own inability seen through the strategic implications of this commando-like operation.

In passing the buck of his fiasco entirely to his political boss, General Musharraf claims that Mr Nawaz Sharif was briefed right through January to July 1999. On dealing with Mr Sharif, whom he later ousted, he portrays himself as an unbelievably weak and timid Pakistan Army Chief. The “Prime Minister asked me several times whether we should accept a ceasefire and withdraw. My answer every time was restricted to the optimistic military situation, leaving the political decision to him. He wanted to fire the gun from my shoulder, but it was not my place to offer it.”

And then writes, “As the Chief of the Army Staff I found myself in a very difficult position. I wanted to explain the military situation, to demonstrate how successful it had been, and point out the political mishandling, which had caused so much despair. But that would have been disloyal, and very unsettling for the political leadership.”

He expresses “consternation” about Mr Sharif flying to the US on July 3, 1999, and writes “…the military situation was favourable: the political decision has to be his (Sharif’s). He went off and decided on a ceasefire. It remains a mystery to me why he was in such a hurry” and ignores evidence to the contrary.

Gen Anthony Zinni, commander-in-chief of the US Central Command, a close friend of General Musharraf, who visited Islamabad on June 24-25, 1999, has written in his book, “Battle Ready”, “The problem with the Pakistani leadership was the apparent national loss of face…. What we (the US) were able to offer was a meeting with President Clinton, which would end the isolation that had long been the state of affairs between our two countries, but would announce the meeting only after a withdrawal of forces. That got Musharraf’s attention: and he encouraged Prime Minister Sharif to hear me out.” Mr Sharif told Raj Chengappa (India Today) that General Musharraf asked him: ‘Why don’t you meet Clinton? Why don’t you ask him to bring about a settlement?”

General Musharraf’s factually incorrect and unconvincing narrative on the Kargil war is an attempt to whitewash a dark chapter of the Pakistan Army under his leadership: of taking a military initiative that went horribly wrong - militarily, diplomatically and politically. Besides the loss of face on the battlefield, his foolhardy isolated Pakistan, with its credibility touching an all-time low. Politically, it became yet another humiliation.

When truth about the Kargil intrusion filtered out in Pakistan, those responsible for the catastrophe were vehemently condemned. A trenchant volley of criticism and agony came from senior retired military officers, top-notch journalists and political leaders, which are well recorded in the Pakistani media. At one place, General Musharraf states, “On our side, I am ashamed to say, our political leadership insinuated that the achievements of our troops amounted to a ‘debacle’. The Pakistan Army was called a ‘Rogue Army’ by some.” This, in fact, was the language used in the Pakistani media.

“In the Line of Fire”, General Musharraf comes across stingy on truth, a bluff master, and a megalomaniac. That raises the question of trusting him. Like in the case of many Pakistanis, I don’t.

The writer was the Chief of Army Staff during the Kargil war. He is presently President, Institute of Security Studies, Observer Research Foundation, (ORF), New Delhi.

Source: The Tribune, Chandigarh, September 27, 2006.